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Exploitation of Persons and the Limits of the Criminal Law  
 
Jennifer Collins* 
University of Bristol 
 
Summary 
The concern in this article is to challenge the rhetorical push toward 
criminalization, which has tended to dominate discussion of the state’s 
response to exploitation of persons.  This article argues that there are 
overlooked limitations in using the criminal law to respond to exploitation of 
persons.  It first highlights imprecision regarding the relationship between 
exploitation of persons and principles for criminalization.  It is argued that the 
logically prior question of the role of the state must be addressed, and that 
one strong normative basis for state action arises from republican political 
theory.  Secondly, it exposes a set of five current challenges concerning the 
use of the criminal law in England and Wales to penalize exploitation, putting 
forward suggestions as to how they can be addressed with principled 
arguments.  The argument in this part is that it is only by exposing and 
confronting these difficulties that clarity in the criminal law can be 
strengthened. 
 
Introduction 
Exploitation of persons is a topic currently attracting the attention of lawyers 
across several branches of the common law, which include contract law, tort 
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law, immigration rules, labour law and the criminal law.1  As ever, there is a 
temptation for law reformers to turn to heavy-handed criminal law measures in 
their response.  Theresa May’s concern as Home Secretary to ensure that 
“the worst perpetrators [of modern slavery] receive the lengthy custodial 
sentences…they deserve”, was the driver to attaching maximum life 
sentences to the offences created in ss. 1-2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.2  
Any such measures, even if they can be clearly justified, carry risks.  Of 
interest to criminal lawyers is Cathryn Costello’s recent analysis of the legal 
response to exploitation of persons in the labour market.3  Costello argues 
that if too much weight is placed on using criminal law measures in this 
context, attention is diverted away from “the laws, practices and regulatory 
gaps that set up the vulnerability to forced labour”.4  “The criminal law focuses 
on the outcome (the forced labour itself)”, whereas a labour law response may 
be better placed to address the source of vulnerability of vulnerable migrant 
workers.5  
 
While it can doubted whether the current criminal law reponse only penalizes 
the outcome of exploitation in the context of forced labour (see part 3 below), 
Costello’s argument is an important corrective to an over-focus on 
criminalization in addressing exploitation of persons.  Criminalisation is, and 
                                                        
* I am sincerely grateful to Andrew Ashworth and David Ormerod for comments on previous drafts, 
and to Stuart Green and Rebecca Williams for discussion of this material.  Parts of this article draw on 
my doctoral research, funded by the AHRC.  The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 For example, Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47; [2014] 1 WLR 2889; Taiwo v Olaigbe and another; 
Onu v Akwiwu and another [2016] UKSC 31; [2016] 1 WLR 2653. 
2 Hansard, HC col.172 (8 July 2014), increasing maximum sentences beyond those laid down in Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 s.59A; Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 s.4; and 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.71. 
3 C. Costello, “Migrants and Forced Labour: A Labour Law Response” in A. Bogg, C. Costello, A.C.L. 
Davies and J. Prassl  (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), p.189.       
4 above, p.191. 
5 above, p.191. 
 3 
should continue to be seen as, limited in addressing the root of power 
dynamics which may lead to exploitation.  But in this article I argue that there 
are other neglected difficulties in using the criminal law against exploitation.  
First, the relationship between exploitation of persons and principles for 
criminalization is characterized by deep complexity and uncertainty, as 
highlighted in part 1.  This leads on to the argument in part 2 that the logically 
prior question of the role of the state must be addressed, and that one strong 
normative basis for state action arises from republican political theory.   
 
Second, taking analysis of the current criminal law response to exploitation in 
England and Wales as its starting point in part 3, part 4 argues that there are 
five current challenges in using the criminal law to penalize exploitation which 
require attention.  There are dangers that clarity in the criminal law can be 
undermined in the following ways: by the tendency to assume that existing 
criminal offences cover exploitative conduct, either intrinsically or through 
judicial interpretation, without supporting argument (illustrated in the property 
offences sphere); by failure to clearly explain what is wrongful about a specific 
type of interpersonal exploitation; by uncertainty about the type of account of 
exploitation which criminal lawyers are providing—be it a cluster of central 
cases, analytical or normative; by lack of coherence between the criminal law 
and other branches of the common law in responding to exploitation; by 
exploitation’s complex relationship with valid legal consent.  Whilst not 
underplaying their deep complexity, some suggestions are put forward for 
navigating these challenges in a principled way. 
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The article’s focus is upon the criminal law response to exploitation in 
interpersonal scenarios such as financial exploitation, sexual exploitation, 
labour exploitation, and trafficking of persons for exploitation, rather than on 
how the criminal law responds to exploitation in the marketplace (for example, 
through the criminalization of cartels).  
 
Exploitation of persons and criminalization principles 
 
At the centre of western free market economies lies the idea that individuals 
are free to engage in commercial practice.6  Individuals have freedom to make 
gain for themselves or another, or to cause loss or the risk of loss to others.  It 
is quite plausible that one individual (A) will use another person (B) in 
furthering his own aims.  For example, A may use another person’s 
characteristics—his gullibility, good nature, generosity or intelligence.  Or A 
may use his more powerful or dominant position over B.  If the claim that “A 
exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B” describes what it means to 
exploit another person at the most general level, then we can say in cases 
where one individual takes advantage of a more naïve person, for example, 
that he is exploiting that person.7  But this “exploitation” is not necessarily 
problematic, nor anything that ought to be redressed by the law. 
 
This is not an unrestricted opportunity.  At some point restrictions must be 
placed on an individual’s freedom to exploit another person.  This is to ensure 
                                                        
6 See Valujevs [2014] EWCA Crim 2888; [2015] W.L.R. 109 at [43]-[44]. 
7 A. Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.16. 
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that both A and B have freedom to flourish. 8   The point at which state 
interference is justified, and what form it should take, are contestable, 
illustrated in Kant’s statement that persons must “treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a 
means only”.9  The Kantian argument does not prohibit all exploitative use of 
persons.  It merely tells against using persons as mere means.  In justifying a 
legal response to exploitation, how can we distinguish between using another 
person (which is permissible), and using someone as a mere means (which is 
not)? 
 
The state has certain international obligations to protect individuals from 
serious exploitation, explored in part 2 below.  For example, while an 
employer may take advantage of an employee in the labour force, he cannot 
subject him to conditions of slavery, servitude or forced labour.  A justifiable 
state response to such conduct may be to create regulatory or labour law 
measures, for example.  Exploitative conduct may also justifiably attract 
criminal law sanction, with strong justification for a criminal law offence 
required, taking into account the type of offence proposed and the level of 
criminalization.  Threshold conditions to criminalization, familiar to liberal 
criminal law theorists, must first be satisfied—the need for a serious public 
wrong, and for conduct which causes harm or poses the risk of harm, for 
example.10  Further principles for criminalization cannot be explored in this 
                                                        
8 A. Ashworth, “Self-defence and the Right to Life” (1975) 34 C.L.J. 307: “Freedom from interference 
can only be preserved by restricting everyone’s freedom to exercise power over others.” 
9 I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lewis Beck (translator) 2nd edn, (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1959) p.47. 
10  See A.P Simester and A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Oxford: Hart, 2011). 
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short piece.  However, we ought to flag initial concerns that exploitation of 
persons will have a more complex relationship with thresholds to 
criminalization than other forms of wrongdoing.  We see this reasoning 
surface in Stuart Green’s comparison of exploitation and coercion in his study 
of the theoretical foundations of white-collar crimes.11  Green’s first argument 
is that exploitation does not produce harm in the same way as coercion: “the 
harms typically associated with coercive behavior are greater than the harms 
typically associated with exploitation.”12  His second is that wrongful coercion 
is “inherently a more serious wrong than exploitation”. 13   Thirdly, Green 
argues that exploitation may be “harder to distinguish from merely aggressive 
but lawful business behavior than is coercion”.14   This is not to say that 
exploitation of persons will never satisfy thresholds to criminalization.  Some 
forms of exploitative conduct will cause harm more serious than coercive 
conduct, for example.  The strength of a particular argument for 
criminalization can only be made robust with appropriate regard to the nature 
of the exploitative wrong and the proposed level of criminalization.  In other 
words, a criminalization argument must be made specific rather then general.  
Nevertheless, a preliminary issue first requires attention.  Without being clear 
about the state’s obligations to redress exploitation of persons, any specific 
argument for criminalization is undercut from the outset.   
 
The role of the state in penalizing exploitation of persons 
 
                                                        
11 S.P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime (Oxford: OUP, 
2006). 
12 above, p.97. 
13 above, p.97. 
14 above, p.97. 
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i. International obligations 
A large number of international documents set out the right of individuals to be 
protected from various forms of interpersonal exploitation, and so provide one 
broad basis for state action.  Protection against the most serious forms of 
labour exploitation (slavery, servitude and forced labour) is widely recognized 
in international human rights documents15, as is the requirement that the state 
addresses sexual exploitation.16  Trafficking of persons is not necessarily the 
same as exploitation of persons, but movement of persons provides 
opportunity for exploitation, and is often undertaken for this purpose.  It is 
sufficiently part of the wider “problem” of interpersonal exploitation to justify 
considering it here.  While a number of international obligations upon the state 
to address trafficking of persons exist17, it is interesting to note that one bold 
development in European Human Rights law has been the European Court of 
Human Rights’ willingness in Rantsev to read into art.4 ECHR a right not to be 
subjected to human trafficking.18   The court relied upon abstract ideas of 
human dignity and fundamental freedoms as the drivers for this 
interpretation.19  The use of ECHR rights to protect against exploitation of 
                                                        
15 Art.4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; art.4 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), as explicated in Siliadin (2006) 43 EHRR 16 at [116], [122]-[123]. The International 
Labour Organization’s (ILO) Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, requires all 
ILO members “to promote and realize…the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour”, 
as well as the abolition of child labour, adopted on 18 June 1998 (revised 15 June 2010). 
16  The European Parliament approved the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality’s 
Report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality (2013/2130(INI)) in 
March 2014.  The report calls on member states of the EU “to discourage the demand for exploitation 
through prostitution and human trafficking for sexual exploitation”.   
17 Arts.2-3, of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(New York: UN, 2000).  Member states of the Council of Europe are required under art.1 of the 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS 197, 2005), to “prevent and combat 
trafficking in human beings, while guaranteeing gender equality”. While the United Kingdom remains 
a member of the European Union, Directive 2011/36/EU on trafficking in human beings remains in 
force in England and Wales (adopted by the UK on 18 October 2011). 
18 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1 at [282]. 
19 above, at [282]. 
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persons is far from settled.  Art.5 ECHR provides that “everyone has the right 
to liberty and security of person”.  The rampant spread of sexual exploitation 
in towns and cities is plainly a threat to the security of persons, so there is 
scope here for counsel to plead this argument before the Strasbourg court. 
 
There is additional and specific protection for children from exploitation.  The 
UN Convention on the Rights of the child requires state parties to protect 
children from economic and labour exploitation (art.32); sexual exploitation 
and abuse (art.34); and abduction, sale and trafficking (art.35).  Art.1 of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse requires member states to prevent sexual 
exploitation, protect the rights to victims, and to promote national and 
international cooperation against sexual exploitation of children. 
 
Criminal law measures may need to be implemented in order to secure these 
rights where existing measures are held to be insufficient.20  The Strasbourg 
court in Siliadin imposed positive duties upon states “to adopt criminal law 
provisions which penalize the practices referred to in Article 4 [ECHR] and to 
apply them in practice” in order to keep pace with international 
developments.21  States are also required to have in place (i) “thorough and 
effective” investigations of breaches of ECHR rights; 22  and (ii) “preventive 
operational measures” to prevent risks to an individual’s ECHR rights “from 
                                                        
20 In CN v UK [2012] ECHR 4239/08 (13 November 2012) at [81], the ECtHR found that art.4 ECHR 
was violated because “investigation into the applicant’s complaints of domestic servitude was 
ineffective due to the absence of specific legislation criminalising such treatment”.  
21 Siliadin (2006) 43 EHRR 16 at [89]. 
22 Aydin v Turkey (1998) 25 EHRR 251 at [103]. 
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the criminal acts of a third party”.23  International human rights obligations and 
EU legislation which must be implemented in national systems, are other 
bases for positive duties upon the state to enact criminal law measures and/or 
effective investigatory machinery and procedures with regard to interpersonal 
exploitation.  Art.5 of the “Palermo Protocol” requires signatory states to 
enact, where necessary, criminal law measures to combat the intentional 
trafficking in persons, as defined in art.3 of the Protocol.  Art.4 requires the 
“prevention, investigation and prosecution of the offences established” in art.5 
of the Protocol.  Moreover, the new Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930—a supplement to the ILO Convention 29, which came into 
force on 9 November 2016—requires effective criminal law measures “to 
sanction the perpetrators of forced or compulsory labour”.24  So too art.18 of 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings CETS 197 2005 requires signatory states to “adopt such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences” 
trafficking in human beings.25  
 
ii. An argument from political theory 
So far we have discussed what the state must do in order to comply with its 
international obligations.  The argument advanced here is that at a deeper 
level a normative basis for state action to redress exploitation must be 
addressed.  Questions about criminalizing exploitation are not removed from 
                                                        
23 Van Colle v United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 839 at [88]. 
24 Art.1. 
25 As defined in art.4. 
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questions about state power, and how that power should be exercised.26  
Republican political theory points most clearly in the direction of a 
foundational duty upon the state to address serious exploitation of persons.  
Republicanism takes as its animating idea “freedom as non-domination”—a 
term coined by Philip Pettit. 27   On this view liberty is the absence of 
domination or independence from arbitrary power.  A person is not free if they 
have “to live at the mercy of another” or if they have to “live in a manner that 
leaves [them] vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to 
impose”.28  While there are a number of streams of republican thought, the 
clear concern in all is with structural conditions being present for arbitrary or 
uncontrolled domination, even if that capacity is not exercised.29   
 
Either the state or fellow citizens may hold such a capacity to interfere 
arbitrarily in a citizen’s life.  The state holds capacity to interfere in its citizens’ 
lives because it has the power to make and enact law, though this is not 
necessarily a capacity to interfere arbitrarily.30  It is the potential for arbitrary 
interference of one citizen by another which is of interest to us here.  In 
Pettit’s account, a citizen should not hold the capacity to arbitrarily dominate 
his fellow citizens: this is a humiliating “form of unfreedom”, which makes one 
                                                        
26  Thus fulfilling the need for a “deeper embedding of criminalisation theory in general political 
theory”, see A.P. Simester and A. von Hirsch, “On the Legitimate Objectives of Criminalisation” 
(2016) (10) Crim. L. and Philosophy pp.367, 370.  
27 P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: OUP 1999).   
28 above, p.5-6. 
29 See S. Besson and J. Martí (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives 
Oxford: OUP, 2009). 
30  J. Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies” in J. Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol 2 
(Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), p.503: “All coercive laws…and in particular all laws creative of liberty, are, 
as far as they go, abrogative of liberty.” 
 11 
citizen’s status dependent upon another’s continued goodwill.31  As Alan Bogg 
and Cynthia Estlund note: 
 
 “where there is a shared awareness of this vulnerability, it is a shaming 
 and demeaning status to occupy.  The dominated citizen might resort 
 to strategies of deference or subterfuge in order to placate the 
 powerful.”32   
 
It is important, Pettit argues, that a citizen need not “live on their wits, whether 
out of fear or deference”.33  There is a strong link here with interpersonal 
exploitation.  Where one individual holds the capacity for uncontrolled or 
arbitrary domination over another, there is real opportunity for exploitation of 
persons.34  Recent research on grooming has explored how exploiters seek to 
set themselves in positions of domination over vulnerable persons.35  In other 
cases, exploiters take advantage of ready-made opportunities for control.  
While capacity for uncontrolled domination is one step removed from 
exploitation, it creates opportunity for exploitation.  When will a citizen hold 
capacity for arbitrary or uncontrolled domination in cases of exploitation?  
Concerns about this structural condition ought surely to only come into play in 
highly problematic circumstances, where exploiters act deliberately to target 
another person and with knowledge of another’s vulnerability.  The task is to 
                                                        
31 See P. Pettit, “Criminalization in Republican Theory” in R.A. Duff and others, Criminalization: The 
Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p.138. 
32 A. Bogg and C. Estlund, “Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest” in Voices at Work: 
Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p.152. 
33  See P. Pettit, “Criminalization in Republican Theory” in R.A. Duff and others (eds), 
Criminalization: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p.138. 
34 “Uncontrolled” domination is Pettit’s more recent term.   
35 For discussion of “localized grooming” and the relevance of “targeting”, see Home Affairs Select 
Committee, Child Sexual Exploitation and the Response to Localised Grooming (5 June 2013) para 8. 
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identify situations where individuals are particularly or highly vulnerable to 
being exploited (such as where persons have been trafficked for the purpose 
of exploitation, or where young persons have been taken into care and are 
therefore deemed “at risk” of exploitation).36  
 
To support republican ideals is not to contend that citizens must be legally 
protected against capacity for arbitrary domination from other persons.  There 
is a strong presumption within republicanism that non-domination is supported 
through civic virtue and deliberative democracy.  Pettit argues that because 
republicanism requires that rights “will be richer than any that the law alone 
could support”, they therefore “depend on the sort of informal implementation 
that is possible only in a vibrant society”.37  State interference may be justified 
only in situations where it is important that a citizen’s safeguarding is “a matter 
of common awareness”.38  If a state must intervene to secure non-domination 
in certain circumstances, this will not in the first instance be via criminal law 
measures, but via regulatory or civil law measures.  Coercive power must be 
exercised within a system of effective procedures and enforcement, with an 
emphasis on the rule of law as an ideal.39  Accordingly, the limitations of the 
normative argument must be made clear in relation to exploitation of persons.  
While a brief survey of republicanism seems in principle to support a 
foundational duty upon the state to deal with serious exploitation of persons, 
                                                        
36  See Barnardo’s, “Puppet on a String: The Urgent Need to Cut Children Free From Sexual 
Exploitation” (2011). 
37 Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1999), p.305. 
38 P. Pettit, “Criminalization in Republican Theory” in Criminalization: The Political Morality of the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), pp.138-39.  “Your safeguarded status must be manifest and salient 
to all…Only then can you walk tall among your fellows, conscious of sharing in the general 
recognition that no one can push you around with an expectation of impunity”. 
39 For discussion, see R. Dagger, “Republicanism and the Foundations of Criminal Law” in R.A. Duff 
and S. Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p.48 ff. 
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this does not justify the use of the criminal law.  That would require analysis of 
arguments for and against criminalization, with arguments in favour 
outweighing arguments against.  While we have focused here on the role of 
the state to address exploitation in the republican tradition, it is arguable that a 
similar grounding could come from within the liberal tradition.40  It is beyond 
the scope of this article to consider how the state’s role in penalizing 
exploitation of persons might fit in to a liberal framework. 
 
The current response of English criminal law 
 
Building on this normative foundation, let us now put this discussion in the 
context of the criminal law of England and Wales.  What is the current criminal 
law response to exploitation of persons in England and Wales?  This is an 
area of the criminal law in flux.  Against strong rhetorical pressure to 
criminalise various forms of exploitation, it is easy to lose track of how many 
“exploitation offences” there currently are. 41   The key examples can be 
divided into two broad categories.  Clearly the meaning of “exploitation of 
persons” requires further interrogation, with discussion of this point to follow in 
part 4 below. 
 
i. The first category is general offences which cover exploitative conduct, 
either intrinsically or through judicial interpretation.  These offences need not 
have been explicitly designed to penalize interpersonal exploitation, but may 
                                                        
40 For example, under the auspices of a “right to security”, see L. Lazarus, “The Right to Security” in 
R. Cruft, M. Liao and M. Renzo (eds), The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (OUP 2014) 
p.424; S. Fredman, “The Positive Right to Security” in B. Goold and L. Lazarus, Security and Human 
Rights (Hart 2007) p.307. 
41 T. May, “Slaves May Work in Your Nail Bar Too” The Telegraph (London, 24 November 2013). 
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penalize certain aspects of exploitative conduct and/or the result(s) of 
exploitation.  In CN v UK, the European Court of Human Rights noted that in 
the absence of a specific exploitation offence to penalize slavery, servitude or 
forced and compulsory labour, several existing criminal offences could be 
used. 42   These included “offences of trafficking, false imprisonment, 
kidnapping, grievous bodily harm, assault, battery, blackmail and 
harassment”.43  Other broad offences could be added to this list: for example, 
many criminal law commentators seem comfortable with theorizing fraud by 
abuse of position as a means of penalizing financial exploitation of the naïve 
and gullible, post-Hinks.44   
 
ii. A second approach has been to enact specific exploitation offences, drafted 
in a variety of forms.  There is scope for debate as to what is meant by 
exploitation offences.  For the purposes of this brief overview we mean 
offences enacted with the purpose of preventing or penalizing exploitative 
conduct and/or the result(s) of exploitative conduct.  The statute itself, or its 
Explanatory Notes, will be the clearest means of establishing an offence’s 
purpose.  Ss.1-2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 can be identified as “core” 
exploitation offences, given references to exploitation in the 2015 Act itself.45 
Sentencing guidelines, Parliamentary debates and judicial statements may 
also need to be referred to in determining whether an offence fits in to this 
                                                        
42 CN v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 24. 
43 CN v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 24 at [74]. 
44 [2000] UKHL 53; [2001] 2 A.C. 241.  See D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp.896-97; A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. 
Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 
p.639. 
45 s.32 of the Human Tissue Act 2004—which criminalizes commercial dealings in human material for 
transplantation—is another example of a core exploitation offence.  This is because s.32 is identified as 
a form of exploitation under s.3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.  The offence carries a maximum 
sentence of three years and/or a fine.   
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broad category.  For example, there is reasonable consensus that ss.47-50, 
52, 53 and 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 are exploitation offences, 
given that they are referred to in this way in the Sexual Offences Definitive 
Guideline.46   The Serious Crime Act 2015 amended all offences of “child 
prostitution” found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, to offences of “sexual 
exploitation of a child”.  
 
Exploitation offences may be drafted in various forms.  Some illustrative 
examples are selected here.  A clear example of a substantive exploitation 
offence requiring harm and culpability is found in s.1 of the Modern Slavery 
Act 2015.  The s.1 offence penalizes a defendant who knowingly “holds 
another person in slavery and servitude”, or who knowingly “requires another 
person to perform forced or compulsory labour”, taking art.4 of the ECHR as 
its definition of these terms.47  The offence attracts a maximum sentence of 
life imprisonment.  Ss.47-50 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 address sexual 
exploitation of persons under 18 years of age.  For example, s.47 penalizes a 
defendant who intentionally obtains sex from an under-18 (not reasonably 
believing that they are 18 or over), or from an under-13.48  The defendant 
must have made or promised payment to another person for these services, 
or known that another person has done so.49 
 
A substantive exploitation offence, which is a strict liability offence, is found in 
s.53A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  S.53A penalizes a defendant who 
                                                        
46 Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences: Definitive Guideline (2013) 2.   
47 s.1(2). 
48 s.47(1)(a),(c). 
49 s.47(1)(b). 
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pays for or promises to pay for sexual services from a prostitute, in 
circumstances where a prostitute has been exploited by a third party in a way 
“likely to induce or encourage” the provision of these sexual services.  The 
defendant need not have been involved in or aware of exploitative conduct 
undertaken by a third party.50   
 
There are a number of substantive exploitation offences with an inchoate 
element, such that Costello’s argument that the criminal law penalizes only 
the outcome of forced labour is too blunt.51  S.2 of the Modern Slavery Act 
2015 penalizes a defendant who “arranges or facilitates the travel of another 
person (‘V’) with a view to V being exploited”.  The inchoate element is that 
the offence penalizes those who arrange or facilitate the travel of another, 
with a view to their exploitation.  This requires intent to exploit during or after 
the travel, or knowledge that another person is likely to exploit V during or 
after the travel (s.2(4)).52 The s.2 offence attracts a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.  S.4 of the 2015 Act contains an offence of committing any 
offence with the intention of committing an offence under s.2, carrying a 
maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.  In relation to sexual 
exploitation, s.52 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 sets out an offence of 
intentionally causing or inciting another person to become a prostitute, “for or 
in the expectation of gain”.  S.53 of the 2003 Act penalizes the intentional 
                                                        
50 Another example can be found in s.55 of the 2003 Act (keeping or managing a brothel, which 
attracts a maximum sentence of 7 years). 
51 C. Costello, “Migrants and Forced Labour: A Labour Law Response” in A. Bogg, C. Costello, 
A.C.L. Davies and J. Prassl  (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), p.191.       
52 Exploitation includes the conduct set out in s.3 of the 2015 Act: slavery, servitude and forced or 
compulsory labour; sexual exploitation; removal of organs; securing services by force, threats or 
deception; securing services from children and vulnerable persons.   
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control of another person in relation to prostitution, with control undertaken 
“for or in the expectation of gain”.53 
 
Exploitation of persons and the limits of the criminal law 
 
Despite high levels of interest in the topic, a principled criminal law response 
to exploitation of persons is far from settled.  Given the current state of flux, 
the time is ripe to emphasize limitations of a criminal law response to 
exploitation.  Rather than underplaying these limitations, they ought to be 
brought out into the open and addressed with principled arguments, if clarity 
in the criminal law is to be strengthened.  This analysis is not intended to be 
exhaustive; rather, the aim is to identify current problems.   
 
The first challenge may be illustrated by reference to the application of 
existing property offences to cover exploitation.  It is commonly argued, post-
Hinks, that fraud by abuse of position can in principle be used to penalize 
exploitation.54  In their criminal law textbook, Andrew Simester and others 
identify fraud by abuse of position as a means of penalising “a number of 
forms of dishonesty that are worthy of the attention of the criminal law”, but 
which fall outside the scope of other dishonesty offences. 55   The writers 
appear to have dishonest exploitative conduct in mind in singling out those 
who dishonestly target the vulnerable.56  Rebecca Williams has argued that 
fraud by abuse of position “was enacted to provide an alternative route for 
                                                        
53 See House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Prostitution (15 June 2016). 
54 [2000] UKHL 53; [2001] 2 A.C. 241. 
55  A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), p.639.  
56 above, p.625. 
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prosecuting [dishonest exploitation]”. 57   Lindsay Farmer has recently 
suggested that the aims of the criminal law’s property offences have now 
shifted.  Rather than protecting property rights “as defined in the civil law”, the 
key concern is now to protect 
 
 “the interests of the vulnerable against conduct which poses a threat to 
 the security of property and the securing of confidence in institutions 
 such as the market in which property is transferred”.58   
 
On this view, the protection offered by certain property offences is to “an 
abstract class of victims (the vulnerable) and to an abstract conception of a 
system of property rights”.59   
 
The problem is what this reasoning conceals.  There is a real danger here of 
burying the wrong of exploitation.  Taking the property offences context as an 
example, the tendency here is to assume that a general fraud offence is fit for 
the purpose of penalizing exploitation of persons without first interrogating the 
contours of the exploitative wrong.  Joel Feinberg’s work on exploitation in 
volume four of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law is often referred to as if it 
is conclusive.60  Feinberg argues that: 
 
 “there are three elements in all incidents of exploitation about which we 
                                                        
57 R. Williams, “Cartels in the Criminal Law Landscape” in C. Beaton-Wells and A. Ezrachi (eds.), 
Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 
p.301. 
58 L. Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Civil Order and Criminalization (OUP, 2016), p.223. 
59 above, p.223.   
60 Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988), pp.176-210. 
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 can raise further questions: how A uses B; what it is about B that A 
 uses; how the process redistributes gains and losses.”61   
 
This is immediately followed up by the argument that: 
 
 “In addition, exploitation (in the pejorative sense with which we are 
 here concerned) is assumed to be unfair (‘taking unfair advantage’) or 
 otherwise subject to adverse criticism”.62   
 
In their insightful analysis of the Hinks decision, Alan Bogg and John Stanton-
Ife explain that exploitation depends upon “the manner in which the victim is 
used, the characteristics that are utilized and the way in which exploitation 
allocates gains and losses”—a further restatement of Feinberg’s observations 
in Harmless Wrongdoing. 63   Bogg and Stanton-Ife do speculate about 
exploitation’s seriousness, arguing that there will be a stronger case of 
exploitation if strong predatory techniques are used, if moral virtues or 
vulnerabilities are utilized, and if there are “extensive gains at the expense of 
the victim’s losses”, but even these assertions are vague.64  While Bogg and 
Stanton-Ife’s analysis of the case of Hinks reinvigorated debate about 
exploitation and property offences in the context of the English theft offence, it 
is now commonplace to assert exploitation’s relevance to the English fraud 
                                                        
61 above, p.179. 
62 above, p.179. 
63 A. Bogg and J. Stanton-Ife, “Protecting the Vulnerable: Legality, Harm and Theft” (2003) 23 L.S., 
p.416. 
64 above, p.416. 
 20 
offence.65  But this shift has not been accompanied by enquiries into the 
wrong under discussion.  This hardly makes sense: if Feinberg’s, and Bogg 
and Stanton-Ife’s conceptual approaches to exploitation require actual gain 
and loss, why is the English offence of fraud a compelling candidate for 
censuring exploitation?  The general fraud offence found in s.1 of the Fraud 
Act 2006 does not require actual gain or loss.  Does this mean that the fraud 
offence does not penalise the gist of the wrong of exploitation?  Moreover, is it 
apparent that existing property offences, such as the general fraud offence, 
protect the “vulnerable” (a category of persons whose members are far from 
clear) from exploitation, as Farmer suggests?  Taking Feinberg’s work on 
exploitation as authoritative is hardly perspicuous in this context.  Even a 
cursory look at the English fraud offence leads one to wonder whether it can 
be used to address interpersonal exploitation clearly and transparently.   
 
In principle, and before considering how an offence will be judicially 
interpreted, it ought to be asked whether i. it is justifiable that an existing 
offence be used to censure exploitation; and ii. if so, whether it is fit for 
purpose to fulfill that function.  The argument is not limited to discussion of 
exploitation in the property offences context, but the limitations of the current 
approach are clearly demonstrated in this context.  Exploitation is an opaque 
concept.  Its meaning is especially unclear where it is used across a variety of 
contexts where attempts are not made to highlight if it has any special 
features in a particular context.  It makes little sense that commentators begin 
with a general and undeveloped idea of interpersonal exploitation in the 
                                                        
65 [2000] UKHL 53; [2001] 2 A.C. 241.  For example, D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law 15th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p.896-97. 
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property offences sphere, arguing that the existing property offences 
adequately penalise this wrong. 
 
Moreover, when the contours of the wrong are not identified, it provides 
opportunity for judicial narrowness in using existing broad offences to penalize 
exploitation.  The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Valujevs is a recent 
example of this.66  A key issue considered by the court was whether the trial 
judge had been right to reject a case to answer in relation to fraud by abuse of 
position.  The defendants worked as unlicensed gangmasters in 
Cambridgeshire, providing agricultural work, transport and accommodation to 
workers who had come to the UK from Latvia and Lithuania.  The defendants 
sought to ensure that their workers were highly dependent upon them by 
creating a situation of “debt bondage”.  Was the position of unlicensed 
gangmaster one in which an individual “is expected to safeguard, or not to act 
against, the financial interests” of his workers, as required by section 4(1)(a) 
of the Fraud Act 2006?  Despite the migrant workers’ highly precarious work 
status and conditions of high dependency upon their employer, Fulford L.J. 
narrowly based his reasoning on why there was a case to answer in relation 
to fraud by abuse of position on control of monies and applicable 
Gangmasters Licensing Standards.67  Even if the general fraud offence is in 
principle a tool which can be used to penalize exploitation of persons, this 
reasoning was not borne out in the Court’s judgment.  While Valujevs was not 
the most extreme case of labour exploitation, it demonstrates the potential for 
inconsistency about how exploitation arguments will be interpreted judicially.  
                                                        
66 [2014] EWCA Crim. 288; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 109. 
67 See J. Collins, “Fraud by Abuse of Position and Unlicensed Gangmasters” (2016) 79 M.L.R. p.354. 
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Where it is important to present the criminal law’s response as one of 
penalizing exploitation, a more targeted criminal law response may need to be 
considered.68 
 
The second challenge, touched upon already, is imprecision.  The meaning of 
“exploitation of persons” is inherently imprecise.  Feinberg’s theoretical 
account, relied upon by criminal lawyers, makes this clear. 69   The three 
elements identified as key to exploitation of persons—how A uses B; what it is 
about B that A uses; and how the process redistributes gains and losses—
may be building blocks of what it is to exploit another person.70  But Feinberg 
makes it clear that each of these three elements of exploitation raise further 
questions, and argues that a full account of exploitation as unfair advantage-
taking would require “a complete normative theory”.71  Rather than seeking to 
offer such a theory, Feinberg instead raises a number of questions which will 
inform decisions about exploitation’s unfairness.   
 
This account opens the way for debate in at least two directions.  On the one 
hand, it is possible to focus on identifying what Feinberg has left out of his 
own account.  While the focus is on three elements core to interpersonal 
exploitation, the issue of a complete normative account of interpersonal 
exploitation is bypassed.  In this sense, the account of exploitation offered by 
Feinberg is “light” and must be supplemented with explanation as to what is 
unfair about interpersonal exploitation.  By contrast, we could read Feinberg’s 
                                                        
68 See G. Williams, “Convictions and Fair Labelling” (1983) 42 C.L.J. p.85. 
69 Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988), pp.176-210. 
70 above, p.179. 
71 above, p.201. 
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account of interpersonal exploitation as itself a description of exploitation’s 
unfairness (thus producing the “heavy” sense of the term).72  Feinberg argues 
that  
 
 “insofar as certain elements are present in a relationship between A 
 and B, that relationship tends to be unfairly exploitative, and, insofar as 
 they are absent, that relationship tends not to be unfairly exploitative”.73   
 
Yet even on this reading, the case for selecting these elements must be 
scrutinized.  Is it defensible that exploitation will only tend to be unfair, as 
Feinberg argues in Harmless Wrongdoing, if it leads to gain for an exploiter?74  
Even if a “heavy” reading of Feinberg’s account is adopted, these building 
blocks of exploitation should not be treated as authoritative.  A willingness to 
scrutinize these elements seems to be what Feinberg intended, given that he 
argues that:  
 
 “A fuller account of the characteristics that distinguish exploitation from 
 mere profitable utilization would follow the outline of exploitation’s main 
 structural elements….and their main combinations and variations.”75   
 
On either a “light” or “heavy” reading there is still plenty of important work to 
do.  Criminal lawyers ought to acknowledge this imprecision in Feinberg’s 
account rather than being tempted to ignore it.  
                                                        
72 I would like to thank Simon Gardner for emphasising this point to me. 
73 above, p.201. 
74 above, p.179. 
75 above, p.201. 
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Theory aside, in practice, where exploitation-based reasoning is employed, 
criminal lawyers must make clear what meaning they are attributing to the 
term.  It seems most accurate to accept that the meaning of “exploitation of 
persons” will vary according to context.  This reasoning is supported by the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v SK:  
 
 “In the modern world exploitation can and does take place, in many 
 different forms. Perhaps the most obvious is that in which one human 
 being is treated by another as an object under his or her control for a 
 sexual purpose. But ‘slavery or servitude’ and ‘forced labour’ are not 
 confined to exploitation of that sort. One person may exploit another in 
 many different ways.  Sexual exploitation is one, domestic servitude, 
 […] another.”76   
 
There will be common elements or building blocks on which all types of 
exploitation are based.  And so, in principle, it is possible to generate a 
general account of what it means to exploit another person spanning sexual 
exploitation, labour exploitation and financial exploitation. 77   Other wrongs 
may also come under a broad umbrella term of “interpersonal exploitation”.  
For example, we noted above that human trafficking is not synonymous with 
exploitation, but is enough part of the “problem” of interpersonal exploitation to 
                                                        
76 [2011] EWCA Crim. 1691; [2012] 3 W.L.R. 933 at 949. 
77 Such that Feinberg’s work on interpersonal exploitation is a useful starting point.   
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justify considering it a sub-category.78  This may be because it is difficult to 
identify the point in time at which human trafficking “crosses over” into 
exploitation.   
 
However, conceptual clarity is improved if different types of interpersonal 
exploitation are identified, and if wrongfulness is explicated in relation to a 
specific type of interpersonal exploitation. This could be done on the basis of 
the interests attacked—sexual, bodily, labour or financial, for example. 79  This 
shifts the focus onto addressing some key questions.  Does exploitation have 
special features in this context?  Are some types of interpersonal exploitation 
linked with targeting certain groups of persons, such as the vulnerable?  Does 
wrongfulness hinge on the fact that a type of exploitation causes certain 
results to occur?  Or will a particular form of exploitative conduct suffice?  Are 
the means used (for example, coercion) independently wrongful?  The next 
step for criminal lawyers is to develop our understanding of these exploitative 
wrongs and to map their intersections. 80   The impact on criminalization 
arguments is clear.  Since there are different ways in which a person can 
wrongfully exploit another person, the state’s duty to prevent or penalise 
exploitation must be reviewed in the light of a specific type of exploitation.  
The state may have a duty to prevent labour exploitation using the criminal 
law but not financial exploitation, for example.  The specific type of 
exploitation in focus must be made clear before criminalization questions can 
be raised and debated.  
                                                        
78 For example, a right that no one shall be subjected to human trafficking has been read into art.4 
ECHR, which prohibits serious labour exploitation, see Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 
E.H.R.R. 1 at [282]. 
79 Notwithstanding that these wrongs may overlap in practice.   
80 This larger task cannot be pursued in this article.   
 26 
 
A third challenge for criminal law theorists follows on: how should the meaning 
of “exploitation of persons” be explicated?  We need to know what type of 
account criminal lawyers aspire to provide.  One approach is to identify clear 
central cases of different types of exploitation—be it clear central cases of 
financial, sexual, labour or bodily exploitation.81  Once a cluster of central 
cases are isolated, the concern is then to isolate key elements of these types 
of wrongful exploitation.  For example, targeting a vulnerable person could be 
a key element of core cases of financial exploitation, but not of sexual 
exploitation.  Inevitably there will be borderline cases which have some 
features of the clear case but not others, or others which have all of the 
features but only to a lesser degree.  An alternative approach is to seek to 
provide a strong normative, analytical account of a specific exploitative wrong.  
This could be done in relation to the interests attacked—for example, by 
offering a normative account of what it means to sexually exploit another 
person.  If we are to utilize the Kantian “mere means” principle, a normative, 
analytical account may be put forward to explain what it actually is to use 
another person as a “mere means”.82  Inevitably there will also be weaker 
and/or borderline cases which fall outside the scope of a strong normative 
account.   
 
The strength of each approach should be debated [and defended] by criminal 
lawyers.  For example, it may be argued that if specific core cases of 
                                                        
81 A. Wertheimer, Exploitation (Harvard: HUP, 1999), pp.33-34, writes about making “exploitation 
claims” in certain contexts, such as that of unconscionable contract, exploitation of student athletes, 
commercial surrogacy, unconstitutional conditions, sexual exploitation in psychotherapy. 
82 I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1959) p.47. 
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exploitation are first identified in the “real world”, there will be a better “fit” 
between an account of the exploitative wrong and our intuitions about what is 
“exploitative”.  Others may doubt the likelihood that these clear examples (and 
perhaps clear intuitions) can be agreed upon.  Regardless of the approach, 
criminal lawyers must be clear about the type of account they are seeking to 
provide and why. 
 
A fourth source of complexity relates to an unclear relationship between 
criminalization and the response of other branches of the common law to 
exploitation of persons.  How does criminalization relate to immigration 
controls, labour market regulation, banking legislation to protect the 
vulnerable, and corporate obligations regarding supply chains, for example?  
The proper starting point is to emphasise the limitations of the criminal law in 
responding to the serious exploitation of persons.  We began this short article 
with Costello’s argument that there is an unhelpful focus on finding criminal 
law solutions for labour exploitation.83  There is a concern here that coercive 
measures can do little to address the reason for labour exploitation—
vulnerability which arises because of migrant workers’ precarious work 
status’.  The appropriate course of action in such cases may be regulatory 
measures in the labour market to address this vulnerability.  Costello argues 
that the “normative core of labour law, seeking to avoid domination in work 
relations, demands that all workers in the territory enjoy labour rights”. 84  
While civil and/or regulatory measures do not preclude a criminal law 
                                                        
83 C. Costello, “Migrants and Forced Labour: A Labour Law Response” in A. Bogg, C. Costello, 
A.C.L. Davies and J. Prassl  (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), p.189.       
84 above, p.227.  
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response to exploitation, it is necessary to justify why criminal law measures 
should also be implemented. 
 
It is also important to grapple with the consistency of the common law 
approach to exploitation, across several branches of the common law.  
Concerns arise where criminal law measures to penalize exploitation are 
enacted while systemic common law deficiencies remain unaddressed.  For 
instance, Virginia Mantouvalou has argued that the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
will not produce a coherent regime to target labour exploitation, so long as it 
stands in conflict with a tied visa system for overseas domestic workers.85  
Immigration Rules 159A-159H tie a migrant domestic worker’s visa to the 
employer to whom they entered the UK for a maximum stay of six months, 
even if that working relationship is exploitative.86  Criticism can be made of 
measures put in place to protect migrant domestic workers who enter the UK 
using this visa. 87   For example, the level of protection offered by the 
requirement of a contract of employment, agreed in advance before a worker 
enters the UK to work, can be doubted.88  One concern is that the most 
vulnerable workers will not have the bargaining power necessary to ensure 
fair terms in advance of their employment.89  Much more could be said about 
the inadequacy of these safeguards.  The key point for the purposes of this 
article is that here is another source of complexity; there is a need for a 
                                                        
85 V. Mantouvalou, “‘Am I Free Now?’  Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery” (2015) 42(3) Journal 
of Law and Society p.329. 
86<http://www.ukbaa.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/part5>. 
87 V. Mantouvalou, “‘Am I Free Now?’  Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery” (2015) 42(3) Journal 
of Law and Society pp.336-37.   
88 Home Office, “Statement of Intent: Changes to Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5 of the Points Based System; 
Overseas Domestic Workers; and Visitors” (February 2012). 
89 See A. Bogg, “Sham Self-Employment in the Supreme Court” (2012) 41 I.L.J. p.328. 
 29 
coherent and interdependent legal response to serious exploitation of persons.   
Certainly it is necessary that the intersections between the criminal law and 
labour law in responding to interpersonal exploitation in the labour market are 
mapped.  
 
A final challenge in utilizing the criminal law to penalize exploitation is 
exploitation’s complex relationship with consent.  How, if at all, is valid 
consent, or lack of consent, relevant to exploitation of persons?  Is there a 
strong case for marking out lack of consent in a core account of an 
exploitative wrong?  Existing legal approaches vary.  Art.3(a) of the Palermo 
Protocol defines human trafficking for exploitation without making reference to 
lack of consent.  Art.3(b) goes on to state that any consent present is 
irrelevant where a person has been trafficked. If an account of financial 
exploitation is linked to property offences in England and Wales, it may also 
be important to note that many major property offences in England and Wales 
do not require lack of consent.90  By contrast, some concepts key to serious 
labour exploitation do require lack of consent.  Forced labour is necessarily 
accompanied by lack of consent since it is work “exacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily”.91  There are stronger reasons to think that lack of 
consent is important when defining sexual exploitation of young adults aged 
16 and 17.  Anne Marie Carrie, Barnardo’s Chief Executive, has argued that  
 
                                                        
90 For example, s.1, Theft Act 1968; s.1, Fraud Act 2006. 
91 I.L.O. Convention No. 29.  This was used as a “starting point” for interpretation of forced labour in 
Article 4 E.C.H.R. in Van der Mussele v Belgium (App no. 8919/80, Judgment of 23 November 1983) 
[32]; and Siliadin (2006) 43 EHRR 287 [117]. 
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 “In recent years there has been great progress in addressing [sexual 
 exploitation] at a national and local level, but everyone coming into 
 contact with vulnerable teenagers needs to remember that they are 
 children too, and cannot consent to their own abuse”.92   
 
The complexity of doctrinal and policy arguments must be teased out by 
criminal lawyers.  The first crucial issue is to clarify what amounts to valid 
legal consent.  A detailed analysis is beyond the boundaries of this 
preliminary article, but Westen’s, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and 
Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to Criminal Conduct, identifies both 
“factual” and “legal” accounts of valid consent, and is a useful starting point.93  
“Factual” consent arises when an individual has acquiesced in a course of 
conduct (factual attitudinal consent), which they may have gone on to express 
(factual expressive consent). 94   A “thicker” legal account of consent also 
needs to be considered.  This involves assessing whether key ideas are 
present for a legal system to hold consent legally valid (prescriptive consent).  
Policy arguments will inform the selection of necessary conditions for 
prescriptive consent.  Westen argues that in the sexual offences context ideas 
of voluntariness, knowledge and competence are key to this assessment.95  
Westen argues that legal consent will be found if a relevant set of factors for 
valid consent are satisfied, or because a legal system imputes valid legal 
consent.  Unlike prescriptive consent, imputed consent is entirely fictitious.  
                                                        
92  “Grooming Victims ‘Still Being Failed’”, Say M.P.s (10 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22836634>. 
93 P. Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to 
Criminal Conduct (Ashgate 2004). 
94 above, p.9. 
95 above, p.180. 
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For this reason, imputed consent is loaded from the outset with policy ideas, 
since it functions “solely to constitute legal judgements about people’s 
relationships to one another”.96 
 
A further complication concerns the relevance of policy arguments in 
determining valid legal consent.  It is tempting to automatically prioritize policy 
arguments in the criminal law on the grounds that recognizing valid legal 
consent is too risky for vulnerable victims.  An illustration can be found in 
analysis of sexual exploitation of 16 and 17 year-olds, who can in England 
and Wales give valid consent to sex.  Recent research has highlighted that a 
“boyfriend” model of sexual exploitation incorporates a broad range of 
conduct, which begins with a young person believing “that they have a 
genuine friendship or loving relationship with their abuser”.97  Victims may 
then be asked “to perform sexual acts with their [boyfriend’s] friends as a 
favour”.98  As the relationship progresses, victims may be  
 
 “required to attend parties and [to] sleep with multiple men and 
 threatened with violence if they try to seek help.  They may also be 
 required to introduce their friends as new victims”.99   
 
                                                        
96 above, p.5. 
97 Report by the Director for Children Services, Action in Response to Child Sexual Exploitation in 
Oxfordshire (26 November 2013), p.35. 
98  Home Affairs Select Committee, “Child Sexual Exploitation and the Response to Localised 
Grooming: Follow-Up” (15 October 2014), p.68. 
99 Report by the Director for Children Services, Action in Response to Child Sexual Exploitation in 
Oxfordshire (26 November 2013), p.35. 
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While it is conceivable that valid legal consent is given to sex on a first 
occasion, if applied, coercion undermines a decision-maker’s ability to make a 
free voluntary decision.   
 
In these circumstances, there is a strong policy argument to automatically 
discount any apparent initial consent given by a 16 or 17 year-old in certain 
cases involving a vulnerable young person.  Of course it is particularly difficult 
to set appropriate “thresholds for intervention with adolescents”.100  Installing 
18 as the age for exploitation offences (like the “position of trust” offences in 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003) ensures that vulnerable young persons do not 
fall through the net in investigating incidents of sexual exploitation on the 
grounds that they have, at some point, apparently consented to sex.  
 
To support these reasons, any non-coercive conduct involved in these types 
of scenarios could be explained as grooming, with grooming viewed as simply 
part of the process of sexual exploitation.  On this view, it does not matter if 
exploitative conduct begins “innocently” with a victim having sex with their 
older boyfriend with no apparent coercion.  What matters is that the process 
ends with a victim having coerced sex with many others.  Coercion applied at 
a later stage “taints” any previous consent given.  
 
However, we should be cautious about prioritizing policy arguments.  Is 
automatically discounting potentially valid consent at an early stage in a 
sexual relationship, in case it leads to exploitation, too high a conceptual price 
                                                        
100 I. Brodie and J. Pearce, “Exploring the Scale and Nature of Child Sexual Exploitation in Scotland” 
(Scottish Government Social Research 2012) 34.   
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to pay for protecting (potentially vulnerable) young adults between 16 and 18?  
What if an exploiter’s aim to attack sexual interests do not come to fruition?  
We can envisage policy arguments being used in determining the relationship 
between consent and other forms of exploitation of persons, too.  For 
example, it may be tempting to presume that victims of elder financial 
exploitation lack capacity to consent, given close links between exploiters and 
the targeting of vulnerable persons.101  However, recent research suggests 
that exploitees may be active participants in financial exploitation, and may 
have capacity sufficient to give valid consent.  Shelly Jackson and Thomas 
Hafemeister have found that elderly victims of pure financial exploitation 
“tended to be physically and financially independent”.102  Their report notes 
that elderly victims of financial exploitation, when compared with the average 
elderly person, 
 
 “tended to have fewer communication problems, less cognitive 
 confusion/dementia, less dependence on others, likely to be younger in 
 age, and to not be experiencing poor social support”. 
 
                                                        
101 See P. Sadler, S. Kurrle, and I. Cameron, “Dementia and Elder Abuse” (1995) 14(1) Australasian 
Journal on Ageing pp.36, 38, who identify a link between cognitive impairment (particularly dementia) 
and elder financial exploitation.  This research involved a small sample, reviewing cases of elder abuse 
in a one-year period for a small number of local service providers for elderly people.  Recent research 
suggests that young persons who have tumultuous lives, who have gone missing, or who have been 
taken into care, are at greater risk of sexual exploitation, see Barnardo’s, The Tangled Web: How Child 
Sexual Exploitation is Becoming More Complex (2012), p.6; Home Affairs Select Committee, “Child 
Sexual Exploitation and the Response to Localised Grooming: Follow-Up” (15 October 2014), p.5. 
102 S. Jackson and T. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of Elderly People vs Other Forms of Elder Abuse: 
Assessing their Dynamics, Risk Factors, and Society’s Response (Final Report to the National Institute 
of Justice 2010), p.9.   
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Indeed, the report makes clear that lack of capacity is not even a dominant 
characteristic of these cases.103  The important point to stress in this piece is 
that exploitation’s relationship to consent may vary depending on the type of 
interpersonal exploitation in question (be it financial, sexual, bodily, labour 
exploitation), and that there may be no sound reason to underplay the 
complexity of the relationship between consent and exploitation in doctrinal 
terms.   
 
Conclusion 
Arguments for criminalisation ought not to be used as trump cards in the 
state’s response to exploitation of persons.  Two lines of argument have been 
developed in this article.  The first is that exploitation’s especially complex 
relationship with principles for criminalisation must be exposed, and this work 
was undertaken in part 1.  But equally important is that the state’s exercise of 
coercive power be grounded in normative political theory.  I have not 
suggested that republican political theory provides a means of justifying a 
particular criminalization decision in relation to exploitation.  Nevertheless, 
legal reasoning about exploitation and the criminal law cannot be detached 
from consideration of the basis of state power, and how that power should be 
exercised.  Should republican political theory prove to be a useful framework, 
as I have argued, then further scrutiny of situations where a citizen will hold 
capacity for arbitrary or uncontrolled domination in cases of exploitation 
should be considered. 
 
                                                        
103 above, p.288. 
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The second line of argument further develops the point that criminalisation is, 
and should continue to be seen as, limited in addressing the root of power 
dynamics which may lead to exploitation.  If criminal law measures are to be 
justified, criminal lawyers cannot ignore five current difficulties indicated in 
part 4 of this article.  At face value the most uncontroversial among them is 
the first—criminal lawyers must resist assuming that existing criminal offences 
cover exploitative conduct, either intrinsically or through judicial interpretation, 
without supporting argument.  On the contrary, the point requires particular 
emphasis in relation to exploitation, given that careful supporting argument 
has not been given in the property offences sphere.  If exploitation arguments 
are to be meaningfully deployed in the criminal law sphere, prioritizing clarity 
and transparency, then attention must be directed toward explicating various 
forms of wrongful interpersonal exploitation.  This also involves prizing apart 
the priority of doctrinal and policy arguments in relation to valid legal consent.  
Of current significance is the unexplored interface between criminalization and 
the response of other branches of the common law to exploitation of persons.  
There is potential for tension between them where, for example, the criminal 
law acts in a protectionist mode in relation to severe labour exploitation whilst 
immigration rules and employment law practices remain unregulated.  Can 
connections between these branches be illuminated?  But nor should the 
limits of the criminal law in protecting vulnerable persons be underplayed, as 
this article has argued.  There is a great deal of important work still to be 
done. 
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